The Role of Central Security Forces in Supporting Authoritarian Regimes in Egypt (1969-2011)

The Role of the CSF in Mubarak’s Era:

After the assassination of Sadat in 1981, Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency and remained in this position for 30 years (1981–2011). In the context of enhancing police strength, Mubarak made several changes to the organizational structure of the CSF. In 1985, a presidential decree was issued to cre- ate two new general administrations in the Suez Canal and Sinai regions and Upper Egypt.34 With this, the general administrations of the CSF covered all of Egypt, ensuring that the regime could confront any internal threats to the country’s security.

A separate department was established for “special operations,” which fo- cused on executing combat operations, guarding significant facilities such as embassies, airports, and radio and television stations, and supporting police operations in the desert and mountainous areas. Each camp of the CSF in- cluded several battalions, with each CSF battalion consisting of three com- panies.35 The number of soldiers in a single CSF company ranged from 250 to 360, while the number of officers ranged from 11 to 16. The CSF conscrip- tion period is three years. Additionally, the CSF undertook various tasks, including suppressing student protests in universities, intimidating striking workers in factories, and farmers protesting the poor supply of irrigation water.36

By 1986, Egypt was suffering from a crisis in paying off its debts, which had reached $25 billion.37 At that time, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar had reached 70 piasters.38 In December 1985, the low monthly salaries of CSF soldiers, which amounted to 6 pounds, were reduced by 80 piasters over five months under the pretext of contributing to paying off Egypt’s debts.39

The spark of the CSF rebellion was ignited on February 24, 1986, following a letter from the Recruitment Department at the Ministry of Interior to the Giza Security Forces Camp. The letter requested that the camp administration post- pone sending the files of those soldiers who may serve for an additional year until further instructions were issued. The soldiers interpreted the decision as their conscription would be extended for a fourth year.40 The members of the camp began a rebellion on the evening of February 25. The soldiers burned their barracks and proceeded to the surrounding streets, where they set fire to and destroyed nine hotels, 42 casinos, and nightclubs.41 As the rebellion spread, the Minister of Interior advocated for the deployment of the military to regain control of the situation. He hesitated to dispatch additional units from the CSF to suppress the rebellion out of concern that these units might potentially align with the rebels.42

On February 26, the military deployed brigades from the Special Forces and armored divisions to the capital and imposed a curfew in Cairo and the sur- rounding urban areas of Giza and Qalyubia.43 The military’s objective was to regain control over the rebellious CSF camps, which saw fierce confrontations that ended on February 27. The Ministry of the Interior later announced the official tally of casualties, which totaled 107 fatalities and 719 injured.44 The Minister of Interior revealed that the number of participants in the rebellion was 17,000 soldiers.45 On March 6, 1986, Zaki Badr, the new Minister of Interior, revealed that the number of CSF personnel was 106,000 soldiers and 3,114 officers distributed across 41 camps.46

Despite the CSF’s rebellion, Mubarak did not de- cide to dismantle or get rid of the forces due to their importance in suppressing public protests and con- fronting Islamic groups that were spreading at the time. Therefore, the decision was issued to transfer many of its camps to areas further from Cairo while improving the living conditions for soldiers in the barracks.

The CSF and Confrontation with Jama’a al-Islāmīyah:

The Jama’a al-Islāmīyah Group, which was involved in the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, believed that one of the primary reasons for the failure of their plan to overthrow the government was the lack of sufficient popular support to ignite a revolution. Consequently, the group decided to postpone their confrontation with the government for a few years until they could build a larger base of popular support. In the meantime, they began to establish a military wing to protect the group from repression by the security forces.47

With the appointment of Zaki Badr as Minister of Interior following the CSF rebellion in 1986, Badr adopted the slogan “Striking at the Heart” against members of the Islamic groups. The CSF, acting primarily on the directives of the State Security Investigations Service (SSIS), implemented this approach. In retaliation, members of the Jama’a al-Islāmīyah attempted to assassinate Zaki Badr in 1989 using a car bomb, which did not detonate. During this period, Egypt entered a phase of intense conflict. According to the Ministry of Interior, the Jama’a al-Islāmīyah carried out approximately 1,314 attacks between 1992 and 1997. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 471 members of the group and the arrest of around 20,000 of its members.48

Under the intense security crackdown by the CSF, the Jama’a al Islāmīyah reached an impasse. On July 5, 1997, its leaders announced an unilateral cease- fire. This ceasefire was followed in 2002 by a series of books published by the group’s leaders in which they renounced their previous ideologies.49 This step marked the end of the era of confrontations between the Islamic group and the security forces. The CSF played a crucial role as the military arm of the Ministry of Interior, while the SSIS handled the strategic planning and execution of counterterrorism measures.

The Road to the January Uprising:

Since Mubarak opened the way for par- liamentary elections in 1984, he has relied on the police to rig the election results in favor of the ruling party.50 This approach was achieved through repression and coercion by the CSF against opposition candidates and their supporters.51 At the turn of the mil- lennium, the influence of the SSIS in-

creased in the local arena during the tenure of Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, who remained in his position for 14 years (1997-2011). The SSIS dominated political life, and the number of arbitrary arrests increased to include thou- sands of citizens. Police brutality against citizens became widespread, and the relationship between the police and citizens deteriorated to the point where it resembled that of a master and slave. The press became increasingly restricted, prompting the organization Reporters without Borders to rank Egypt 127th out of 178 countries in the 2010 Press Freedom Index.52

In 2010, several events acted as the straw that broke the camel’s back, igniting the spark that led to the January uprising. Among the most notable events was widespread election fraud during the parliamentary elections, so the ruling party won 97 percent of the parliamentary seats, and 49 police officers were elected as members of parliament.53 It became widely believed that Egypt had transformed during Mubarak’s era from a military state into a police state.

Then came the incident of the killing of the young man Khaled Saeed at the hands of police in the summer of 2010. Pictures of his body with signs of bru- tal beating spread. Some young people created a Facebook page called “We are all Khaled Saeed,” which attracted more than half a million followers in three months. Egyptians felt that no one was safe anymore,54 and the page called for citizens to demonstrate on January 25, the celebration of Police Day. This call came in conjunction with the revolutionary atmosphere in Tunisia, which led to the overthrow of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in early 2011.

Mubarak underestimated the growing wave of public anger against him, as he succeeded in holding onto power for 30 years, facing little organized opposi- tion except for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was not seeking a revolution in Egypt. Interior Minister Habib al-Adly said in an interview on January 25, “Those who plan to take to the streets have no weight … Security forces are capable of deterring them … and those who hope to repeat the Tunisian sce- nario are teenagers.”55

The surprise came on January 25 when several thousand protesters responded to calls to demonstrate in Cairo and other cities such as Suez, Mahalla, and Damietta. The CSF resorted to using rubber bullets, tear gas, and water can- nons to disperse the protesters, and around 4,000 demonstrators were ar- rested.56 However, the protests continued over the next two days and calls for extensive demonstrations spread following Friday prayers on January 28.

The protests continued, and the military issued several statements acknowl- edging the protesters’ demands and refusing to use force against them. In the end, the efforts of the CSF and the ruling regime to suppress the uprising were unsuccessful as the protests and demonstrations became more massive and widespread, leading Mubarak to announce his resignation on February 11 after 18 days of continuous protests. The military prioritized its institutional interests over President Mubarak’s stay in power, allowing the collapse of the CSF and the entire police force. This pressure led Mubarak to step down amid the siege of his presidential palace in Cairo by protesters, while the army en- sured Mubarak’s safe exit from power.

According to the former head of the SSIS, General Hassan Abdel Rahman, the estimates of the SSIS anticipated the participation of 5,000 protesters in the January 28 demonstrations in Cairo.57 Based on that, a plan was drawn up to confront the protesters with 17,000 CSF soldiers in Cairo.58 However, the Ministry of Interior was surprised by the massive participation of protest- ers, numbering hundreds of thousands in Cairo.59 Furthermore, the protests persisted for several consecutive days, resulting in exhaustion among the CSF forces. They faced depleted ammunition and fatigue due to continuous work without rest. This led to the exhaustion of wireless device batteries coinciding with disruptions in phone networks, impeding communication between sol- diers and their leaders. Consequently, with support severed from the troops, the field formations withdrew from their positions.

The reasons for the failure of the CSF to suppress the January protests can be summarized as follows: Political deadlock, deteriorating economic conditions, widespread human rights violations, increased poverty and unemployment caused by Mubarak’s policies over 30 years, and the growing talk of his son, Gamal, inheriting power, prompted huge numbers of citizens to respond to calls to protest. The Ministry of the Interior failed to comprehend the extent of public anger and provide estimates anticipating limited protests for one day, while large numbers of protesters took to the streets in a wide geographical

area for several consecutive days, exhausted the CSF and contributed to cut- ting off their supply lines, causing their soldiers to withdraw haphazardly from the streets, especially in Cairo. This chaos and confusion led to a breakdown in communication between the leadership of the Ministry of Interior and the troops on the ground.

The participation of diverse sectors of citizens in the protests hindered the CSF from engaging in widespread killings of protesters, given the negative reper- cussions that would have fueled the protests. Moreover, the lack of a specific organizational structure for the protest organizers impeded the ability of the SSIS to arrest individuals who could have ended the protests via detainment. The military’s decision to withdraw support for Mubarak and refrain from backing the Central Security Forces (CSF) under mounting public pressure reflected concerns over potential defections within its ranks if it moved against the people. This shift was further reinforced by U.S. President Obama’s explicit call for Mubarak to step down and avoid suppressing protesters.60

According to institutional realism, the Egyptian military’s alignment with Mubarak in 1986 during the CSF rebellion can be attributed to the perception that its institutional interests were not under immediate threat. Furthermore, the CSF rebellion offered a chance to reaffirm the military’s role as the guard- ian of the ruling regime. However, a contrasting situation unfolded during the 2011 protests when the military prioritized its institutional interests over those of Mubarak. In 2011, the military was concerned about the potential conse- quences of engaging in widespread repression against the protesters who had united against the ruling regime. Additionally, pressure from the United States to persuade Mubarak to step down and prevent further suppression of the cit- izens heightened the military’s concerns and encouraged it to move away from Mubarak’s support.

After the July 2013 coup, Abdel Fattah el-Sissi learned a pivotal lesson from the collapse of the CSF in the face of the demonstrators during the January 2011 uprising. Therefore, in March 2014, he established rapid intervention forces from all branches of the armed forces, with a strength equivalent to two mili- tary divisions, to participate in confronting the demonstrations, especially in Cairo and Alexandria.61 The CSF remained to act as a strike force for the Min- istry of Interior.

Conclusion:

The defeat of the Egyptian military in the 1967 war led to Nasser reducing the military’s role in internal affairs, distancing it from politics, and focusing on rebuilding the military based on professional competence. Despite this effort, Nasser faced angry public protests over policies that led to their defeat. Protests began in February 1968 by students and workers following lenient prison sentences for Air Force leaders accused of negligence in the 1967 war. Security forces could not confront the protests that repeated in November 1968, forcing Nasser to rely on the military to disperse student sit-ins and public protests. Nasser began thinking about building a new security apparatus capable of suppressing mass demonstrations, leading to the militarization of the police in Egypt since the establishment of the CSF in 1969, which became the first line of the regime’s defense against mass protests.

This article concluded that the CSF failed to respond to massive, unexpected public protests, as happened in January 1977, leading Sadat to rely on the military to suppress the unrest. Similarly, during the January 2011 protests, Mubarak turned to the military for support, but the latter prioritized its insti- tutional interests over those of Mubarak, refusing to side with him.

The repressive tactics employed by the CSF to uphold regime security gener- ated fear and hatred among citizens, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the police force and the state itself. As a result, public protests are more likely to occur, prompting the head of state to rely on the military for support. This situation, in turn, carries the inherent risk of a military coup, as was witnessed during the January 2011 revolution under Mubarak’s regime.

Reforming the CSF requires a broader framework that focuses on the indi- vidual as a reference for security concepts, rather than the state or the ruling regime. This shift would propel the adoption of sound policies aimed at pro- tecting citizens from tyranny and granting them the freedom to choose their rulers, as well as the power to hold them accountable through political and constitutional channels. Such an approach would reduce the need for massive security apparatuses dedicated to suppressing the masses and open the door to embracing modern policing models that uphold the dignity of citizens, such as community policing. Additionally, it would alleviate the burden of exorbi- tant economic expenses associated with recruiting and sustaining hundreds of thousands of CSF forces.

Practical measures that can contribute to reforming the CSF include: changing the CSF military culture by abolishing regulations that enforce military hierar- chy within its ranks and appointing a civilian director to lead it; reducing the percentage of illiterate individuals among the CSF personnel; ensuring trans- parency and accountability by publicly disclosing the CSF’s annual budget and subjecting its activities to oversight by the parliament and society; Granting the CSF the responsibility of rapid intervention and riot control, accompanied by clear regulations that outline the proper use of force and the consequences of violating these regulations; establishing a system for voluntary recruitment and affiliation to the CSF and eliminating the mandatory assignment of re- cruits to join. Implementation of these measures will not only alleviate the tension between the ruling regime and society but also enhance the legitimacy of the state and diminish the reliance on huge security apparatuses.

This paper was originally published by: Insight Turkey Journal 2025 . Vol. 27 / No. 1 / pp. 217-234.

Endnotes:
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