The Struggle for Free Will: Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing International System

The book was first published in Arabic by the Idrak Center for Research and Consultations– Istanbul in 2017, with a new edition released in 2024. In 277 pages, the book traces the evolution of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the republic, analyzing it through the lens of International Relations, with a particular emphasis on the Realism paradigm.

The book is divided into five major chapters with each chapter dealing with a transitional period or sudden changes that the international system has undergone and its impact on Turkish foreign policy.

In the theoretical framework, the author relies on structural realism to analyze the Impacts of the international system structure on the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy since its inception. Although historical and geographical factors are among the most influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy, the author prefers to rely on the structure of the international system with its anarchic nature and the changes that have occurred within it as an influential factor. This is based on the main problem of determining the limits of the impact of sudden changes on the structure of the international system on the major trends of Turkish foreign policy in its regional and international environment.

Fledgling Türkiye in the Interwar System:

The author divides Chapter I on Turkish foreign policy during the inter-war period into two parts. The first part talks about the establishment of the Turkish republic and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s project, while the second part focuses on Turkish policy during the reign of Hüseyin Numan Menemencioğlu.

Starting with the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, a new direction in foreign policy emerged. The end of the Ottoman Empire era led to the new republic cutting all ties with the Ottoman past. Khechib summarizes the goals of Turkish foreign policy during this stage in the phrase attributed to Atatürk, “peace at home, peace in the world.” The main principle driving its foreign policy was resorting to peaceful means and loyalty to international law to achieve full recognition of Turkey as an independent state and to achieve modernization, which it considered synonymous with Westernization. The latter idea is both a principle and a goal crystallized in Turkey’s strong desire to join NATO and the European Union.

The author argues that Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire a regionally unstable environment with many adversaries, which increased its sense of continuous security threats, especially from the Russian danger in the north. Confronting Russia became one of the early principles of Turkish foreign policy.

Moving on to the World War II period, the author provides a narrative of Turkey’s situation and policy during that time. Turkey adopted a foreign policy that aligned with the international balance of power, and its diplomacy was very successful and pragmatic in terms of both importing and exporting weapons from both sides involved in the war. As described by the British diplomat Nevil Henderson, this policy was built on an Anglo-Turkish alliance on the one hand and the non-aggression treaty signed with Germany on the other, meaning an active and effective neutrality policy. Nonetheless, Turkey was subjected to external and internal pressure to join the war against the Soviet Union and abandon its neutral stance.

This was not the best period for Turkey, but it laid the first foundations for the state, and the author considered the real gain that decision-makers aspired to and implemented was the resistance to the expansionist Ottoman tendency, leading to the emergence of the Turkish national state.

Türkiye in the Cold War:

This chapter is also divided into two parts. The first part discusses the restrictions imposed by the Cold War on Turkish foreign policy, while the second part focuses on the dream of free political will during the reign of Turgut Özal. Khechib believes that the Cold War period was the reason for Turkey’s deep dependence on Western aid in exchange for the United States’ use of Turkish military bases to achieve its main goal of full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

At the same time, Turkey suffered from internal crises, and its economic situation began to deteriorate. The beginning of internal conflicts emerged, which reflected on Turkish foreign policy and made the country’s primary goal to improve its economic and social situation rather than overcoming strategic fears.

Turkey’s need for economic support led it to open the door to the first enemy, the Soviets, in 1960 when the government agreed to exchange visits with Khrushchev. However, this opening did not last long as a military coup in Turkey led to a military government that involved Turkey in one of the century’s most dangerous international crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

At this stage, the desire to improve relations with the Soviets became a turning point in foreign policy for a country that had previously considered the Soviets its first and biggest threat. The writer believes that the reason for this shift was not the mutual visits with the Soviets, but rather other underlying crises such as the Cyprus crisis, which caused a rift with the West and rapprochement with the Soviets, and then rapprochement with non-aligned countries and Middle Eastern countries.

Moving on to the second part of this chapter, the author discusses Turgut Özal, “the man of contradictions”, who served as the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983-1989. Özal brought about a change in foreign policy from his predecessors and witnessed Turkey’s rapprochement with the Islamic world.

The author believes that the ambition to build an active Turkish state began with Özal, but the contradiction lies in his support for US policies in the Middle East and his insistence that Turkey’s interests required relationships with the US and European countries. He agreed to play the role that the US had set for them in the region from a pragmatic perspective, which was to be an impregnable fortress against Iran and to support the West in their policies against radical states.

Khechib argues that in every period of Turkey’s life and with the succession of leaders, there has always been a factor that has had a greater impact on foreign policy than other factors. In the period preceding Özal, the economic and social situation had a significant impact, while during Özal’s rule, personal factors played an important role in determining his foreign policy. Nonetheless, the predominant inclination of Turkish foreign policy remains guided by the delicate equilibrium of power among the major global players.

Turkish Foreign Policy in a New International Environment (End of the Cold War):

In the third chapter, the author discusses the major transformations in the international system and the opportunities that the new environment provided for Turkish foreign policy.

Turkish policy focused on three main axes after the end of the Cold War: the Caucasus region, Central Asia and the Balkans, and the Middle East. Previously, Turkey had a traditional policy of not getting involved in regional politics, but the situation changed with the emergence of a vacuum in the region, the growing risks crossing Turkey’s borders, and the threat posed by mixed national groups. The author believes that the new international system, free from sharp polarization, gave Turkey greater room to maneuver in choosing a new direction. Turkey now saw itself as a regional power, and the relationship between the United States, as a pole and dominant power, as based on common threats.

In the past, the Soviet Union was the common threat, but after the end of the Cold War, the new common denominator disturbing the United States and NATO were the security threats present in Turkey’s neighborhood.

The author also addresses another key idea in this chapter, which is Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East and its relationship with Turkey’s project of “Free Will” as he calls it. Khechib considers that the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was the first test for the Free Will Project. In this regard, the author addresses both the internal and external circumstances that surround Turkey and affect the development of its foreign policy.

On the external level, there is an increase in crises and difficult regional events (security threats and a beginning change in Turkey’s position regarding Middle Eastern crises, the Syrian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.). This leads to a discussion of Turkey as a policy producer rather than policy executor.

At the domestic level, political instability and the rise of political Islamist movements with Erdogan’s arrival to power have affected Turkey’s external orientation. In addition, internal conflicts have led to the emergence of a new perception of Turkey, which now sees itself as part of the Muslim world, resulting in a debate over identity. However, this situation did not last long, as with Erdogan’s consolidation of power, the role of the external environment on the internal and foreign policies re-emerged. The most likely possibility is that Western pressure and influence within Turkish political movements, including within the military ranks, hindered or disrupted the project of free will before it could even begin.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century:

In the fourth chapter, the author discusses Turkey’s foreign policy since the rise to power of AKP (Justice and Development Party), as well as the role of the regional and international environment in which the ruling party found itself.

Khechib argues that despite AKP, being an Islamist party or an extension of a previous Islamist party, was more moderate and open, claiming to be a conservative democratic party. There was no radical change with their rise to power, as Turkey maintained the dominant secular vision of the country and did not review its foreign policy, as Turkey’s Western orientation remained intact.

The AKP’s approach to the European Union accession issue was different from that of previous Islamist parties. Instead of rejecting membership outright, the AKP used the issue to strengthen its position and gain support from conservative voters. Despite this, the party has maintained a Western orientation in its foreign policy and has focused on improving economic and trade relations with Europe. At the same time, AKP has also sought to strengthen ties with Arab and Islamic countries.

On the issue of Palestine, AKP has taken a balanced approach supporting Palestinians’ rights while also seeking stability in the region. Turkey has played a pivotal role in international efforts to bring peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

It is important to note that AKP has not abandoned its Islamic ideology since coming to power but has instead sought to balance its ideology with the interests of the Turkish State. The party has adopted a pragmatic and balanced approach to foreign policy that takes Turkey’s national interests into account.

In the second part of this chapter, the author discusses the “Strategic Depth” thesis, which he considers the most influential thesis on Turkish foreign policy since the AKP took power. The thesis is based on the idea that Turkey needs to reconsider its historical heritage, geographical location, and role in foreign policy to raise its regional and international status. The author argues that this theory has been the main strategic step in Turkish policy since 2002, supporting Turkey’s active involvement with regional systems.

The author presents many examples that indicate Turkey’s openness to its regional environment and improved relations with countries by resolving issues with the Arab world, energy policies, water policies, and its role in the Arab Spring, which he describes as paradoxical. He also compares Turkey’s stance and direction in each country during the Arab Spring revolutions (Egypt, Syria, Libya, etc.). In this context, the author considers Turkey’s policy towards Syria to be the second test of the Turkish free will project.

Therefore, the author outlines the following six main stages of Turkish policy in Syria:

The first phase: Using its existing authority to push for transformation within Syria.

 The second phase: Assisting the Syrian opposition and working against the government there.

 The third phase: During the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Turkey came under fire for its support of the opposition.

 Fourth phase: Turkish policy was weakened and unsteady, particularly over its involvement in the coalition against ISIS and its sustained support for Arab and Turkmen opposition organizations fighting the Assad government.

 The fifth phase: After shooting down a Russian aircraft, Turkey triggered a diplomatic crisis with Moscow and paralyzed its influence in northern Syria, isolating it from the country and increasing border risks.

The sixth phase: According to the author, this is a significant stage that is defined by Turkey’s use of military force in northern Syria with US approval.

Power Shift to the East, the Rise of New Eurasianism, and the Future of Turkish Foreign Policy:

In Chapter five, the author discusses the current transformations in the international system, represented by the shift of power towards the East and the rise of Eurasia, and how this shift has affected the future of Turkish foreign policy.

The author considers this stage as the final test for the project of free Turkish will.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, Khechib explains the thesis that the post-Cold War era is transitional, and that the United States’ rise to the top of the world is only temporary in light of the global transformations posed by Eastern and Southeast Asian countries which form a rapidly evolving axis, and the flourishing of competitors such as Russia, China, and India in addition to the setbacks faced by the United States.

The author emphasizes that Asia has become a major stage for the interactions of the twenty-first century within the framework of the economic shift to the East, and that we are facing a new reality with the rise of the East simultaneous with the decline of the West from its dominant position.

In the second part of the last chapter, Khechib discusses Turkey’s critical relationship with the West, particularly at the security level. Turkish security has long been linked to the West, but the Justice and Development Party realized that Turkey’s reliance on the United States would result in the surrender of Turkish free will to the West. Therefore, one of the main principles of the Strategic Depth Doctrine was a commitment to a multidimensional policy, leading Turkey towards building strategic ties with the Eurasian East.

The author delves into Turkey’s ambitions to become a prominent player in both the regional and global arenas, with a focus on the military and arms industry. Turkey hopes to target Asia and the Middle East as potential markets for Turkish arms companies.

In the last part of this chapter, the author questions the seriousness and realism of Turkey’s aspirations, as well as the strength of Turkey’s bilateral relationships with the major powers in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. What are the limits of Turkey’s relationship with the East, and can the Shanghai Cooperation Organization be an alternative to NATO?

Khechib examines the limits of the relationship between Turkey and the major powers in the organization (Russia, China, and Iran). The author argues that Turkey has economic and trade relations with all of them, which could facilitate its accession to the organization. However, there are fundamental disagreements, starting with Russia’s relationship with Turkey, including the Georgian crisis, the Syrian crisis, and even the Arab Spring crises.

As for China, the author believes that China has doubts about Turkey’s actual commitment and whether Erdogan is using the Shanghai issue as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with NATO. The author confirms that the real crisis in Turkey’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the lack of strategic trust, in addition to the fundamental differences between the organization’s principles and Turkey’s policies, primarily the principle of respecting the sovereignty of states and non-interference. In contrast, Turkey is one of the countries that supports military intervention to change regimes.

Djallel Khechib concludes his book with a final statement that the structure of the international system remains the primary factor shaping and directing Turkish foreign policy. Overcoming this requires the presence of a national political elite that can improve its understanding of the international situation.

Critical Reflections:

Due to the great importance of this book, in this review, we will seek to read the book from different angles, after defining the most important aspects mentioned in it, and presenting the most prominent ideas and concepts that the author has put forward in its pages. We will examine here the book’s strengths as well as its most significant gaps:

• The book covers a significant amount of historical and political information about Turkey’s foreign policy, which could be useful for readers interested in the topic.
• The author relied on important and authentic references closely related to the topic. He also presented different perspectives from experts and researchers to support his position and to cover all aspects surrounding the topic.
• Struggle for free and independent will is a theme that the author focuses on in the book, as indicated by the title. But I think that even if Turkey wants to keep a certain level of independence in its foreign policy, this goal is in direct opposition to neighboring countries’ desire to approach the West. This was demonstrated by its persistent pursuit of membership in the European Union and its desire to uphold harmonious relations with the West. Does Turkey actually desire to be free? Or are the benefits offered by the Western umbrella more significant? Is the Turkish project for free will being hampered by other internal pressures? There is a conflict between historical position, geographic location, and resources, as well as a sincere desire for an independent policy.
• One of the positive points that the author focused on is the Turkish relationship with the West, which he considered the pivotal issue of its foreign policy, which is undebatable. However, despite the fact that the limits of this relationship and the gains that can be made to serve Turkey’s interests are the main drivers of its policy, I do not agree with the belief that Turkey was fully independent in determining the boundaries of this relationship and its proximity or distance from the West and its liberation from the American umbrella. To the same extent that the structure of the system affected Turkish policy, Western influence and pressures played an important and significant role in the continuity of Turkey’s subordination, which has often been described as passivity, but in reality, there was a lack of maneuvering and an absence of a real alternative.

• The author mentions the transformation of Turkey from a policy implementer to a policy maker and from a security recipient to a security provider. I believe that this point is important if we analyze it from a constructivist perspective, which is the change in Turkey’s perception of itself and its position, where it now sees itself as a regional power rather than a Western ally. The realist perspective cannot provide a sufficient explanation for this point.
• It appears that there is a gap in the study which is not related to the author but rather to the constraints because of the author’s use of the realist perspective and his focus on the international system as a factor in determining Turkish foreign policy. However, some changes in Turkish foreign policy had been related to individuals in positions of power, each of whom had a different political goal and perspective on Turkey’s role in the world. This methodology highlights the importance of adopting the decision-maker’s approach in this study to fill in the gap in the realist perspective.
• In the same context, I believe that the author delved into and expanded his analysis of this topic, which raises the question of whether this depth in presentation is negative or positive.

Starting from the title and extending to the content, the study can be divided into two books, not one. The first is about the international environment only and its impact on Turkish foreign policy without delving into the internal level significantly and without referring to other approaches. As we have noticed, the author extensively discussed the internal situation in Turkey and its impact on the crystallization of foreign policy, as well as the role of decision-makers circulating in power, although realism does not recognize the internal environment as a determinant of foreign policy. The second can be devoted to the project of free and independent will, delving into this important idea and analyzing it with other approaches, such as critical or constructivist approaches.

• Regarding the author’s discussion in chapter V about Turkey joining the Shanghai Organization, I believe that the issue is not with Turkey and its actual intentions to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but rather the intentions of the major powers forming the organization and the privileges that will enable Turkey to abandon the Atlantic umbrella.
• Realism is able to identify Turkey’s challenges but cannot provide an effective solution to these problems that would end Turkey’s dependence on the West. The author thinks that the Turkish political elite holds the key to putting the project of free political will into action.

Therefore, realism has fallen short of providing a sufficient response to Turkey’s problems and even if we go with a scenario that the solution is to support the current shift in the international system toward the rise of the East as a rival to the United States, doing so will not result in much change in the near or medium term. Turkey and those nations constantly differ on strategic matters and core principles, and thus relying on them as allies as an alternative to the West would only create a new dilemma.