A View of the Middle East from Within

If Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas agree on one thing it is the fact that the Middle East will never be the same after October 7th, 2023. Obviously, their vision for a future Middle East is entirely different. This difference reflects the nature of the conflict and the dilemma in which the Middle Eastern region has been entangled for many decades. At the risk of oversimplifying things, the essence of this dilemma lies in hegemony and self-determination, control, and emancipation. The story begins with contending visions for the reconfiguration of the region and aborted transformations. Evidently, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture, influenced by immobilizing internal dynamics and dominant external policies. A fundamental reconfiguration of the region is clearly needed, but it cannot be artificially engineered or externally inspired. It must originate from within and be based on the authentic common bonds and aspirations of the peoples of the region.

Contending Visions and Five Rules of Hegemony:

Two visions compete over the future of the Middle East: a dependent one embraced by the West and their local interlocutors; and a unified and sovereign one that desires dignity and freedom. External actors have always viewed the Middle East (consisting mostly of Arab states) as a strategically vital area, too important to be left to its peoples to decide its fate. For more than a century, it has been an arena for external rivalries—between the British and the French, the Americans and the Soviets, and presently, the Americans, Russians, and Chinese. The quest for hegemony over the region followed a pattern of five unchangeable rules.

Rule 1: No strong regional power shall rise to threaten the strategic interests of external powers.

This principle has historical roots dating back to the nineteenth century when the ambitions of the then Ottoman governor of Egypt Muhammad Ali extended beyond Egypt’s borders, trying to build a regional empire and challenge his Ottoman patrons. Britain and France, the imperial archrivals, allied with the Ottomans to defeat him in 1840 and crush his regional aspirations. The humiliating terms of his defeat included the reduction of the size of the Egyptian army and the dismantling of its industries to prevent the re-emergence of a strong Egypt and any future threats. This pattern kept recurring in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the Islamic Republic’s regime in Iran. It will keep recurring as long as external powers view the geostrategic assets and natural resources of the region as integral to their vital interests. Any strong regional power that seeks to assert political and economic sovereignty will likely face a similar fate.

Rule 2: Encourage fragmentation and prevent the unity of the region.

The political configuration of the region followed a different path than the European model of the nation state. Since the seventh century, the region gradually evolved into a massive entity (a vast empire under the Umayyads and Abbasids, or regional empires under the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Moghuls). The last three persisted for centuries and were functional until the imperial onslaught in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not long ago, this history was vivid in the minds of old “Middle Easterners.” My grandmother identified herself as an “Ottoman subject” and with the “province” from which she hailed, not with a “nation-state.” Indeed, at her time, there was no nation-state (with Iran, Türkiye, and Egypt being the only exceptions), but mostly provinces and regions to which most of the inhabitants of the region affiliated. There was a caliphate that represented, symbolically, the unity of the Muslim “umma,” or communities until its abolishment in 1924. The umma is an organic term referring to the community of Muslims that encompassed different ethnicities, races, languages, and geographic areas. Apparently, this model stood in stark contrast to the Western-inspired nation-state model adopted by the post-colonial states. The aspiration to restore the old and more inclusive model is still alive among certain actors, particularly Islamists, for its potential to resolve the multiple sectarian and ethnic issues that the post-colonial nation state model has generated and to achieve the future unity of Muslim societies, evoking the Golden Age of Islam when the region was more integrated and prosperous.

The Arab peoples share so much in common, including language, history, religion, traditions, and national aspirations to be united or at least organized under some form of functional integration. However, external powers, as well as local leaders, have consistently intervened to prevent such unity through various strategies and plans. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Accords, concluded between Britain and France, have had a lasting impact that divided the provinces of the Ottoman Empire and established artificial borders between newly emerging Arab states. Other measures included creating regional divisions, exacerbating sectarian rifts, intervening in conflicts, and supporting regimes that embraced nationalist sentiments.

Arab regimes have contributed to the fragmentation of the region as well, mostly through their political rivalries and pursuit of narrow interests. Ideological rifts between republican and monarchical regimes dismantled the region, erected barriers, and provoked proxy wars. Post-colonial Arab regimes have promoted nationalistic sentiments over pan-Arab identity. Economic visions and strategies prioritized national interests and hindered regional integration between Arab states. Regimes exploited sectarian divisions and brutally stifled dissent to consolidate power. Regional organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States are weak and ineffective because of the conflicting interests of their member states. The educational systems and state propaganda promote national identities over the larger Arab identity. Pan-Arab movements and parties are placed under legal restrictions and even suppressed in some Arab states. These actions hinder unity and sow distrust and hostilities among peoples who initially share much in common.

Rule 3: Engulf the region in persistent conflicts.

The Middle East is widely known as a region inherently wrought with conflict and violence. These persistent conflicts are not solely the result of external interventions but also due to internal political disputes, regime rivalries, and sectarian tensions. It was no coincidence that before leaving the region, the British and French crafted artificial borders between newly emerging states. These engineered borders neither reflect nor contain the national aspirations of their people and continue to feed potential and existing conflicts. The creation of Israel, supported by external powers, has entangled the region in constant wars, draining its human and natural resources. The “low intensity wars and protracted conflicts” allow the external actors to intervene and control outcomes. Since 1919, the region has witnessed dozens of armed conflicts and popular upheavals, some of which have lasted for decades. These included liberation wars, civil wars, border wars, regional wars, invasion wars, containment wars, sanction wars, and ethnic wars. In some, the external powers were primary actors, fought them directly or through local proxies, or supported both feuding sides. These conflicts have cost the region millions of casualties since 1914, and continue to do so to the present day. I have personally witnessed over a dozen such wars in my lifetime. The unresolved Palestinian issue represents a focal point of conflict in the region, symbolizing broader geopolitical tensions and underscoring Western reluctance to address the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and their grievances. The current Gaza war is yet another dark chapter in the region’s geopolitics and the strategies of Western actors, especially the United States, which acted as a direct accomplice to this horrific war, and many European countries that continued to display chronic ineffectiveness and hypocrisy. However, the biggest failure is to blame on the Arab leaders who have been unwilling to develop an effective structure for conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

Rule 4: Separate the region from its natural security belt.

The Arab states, home to over 400 million people across 22 countries, constitute the Middle East’s heartland, flanked by Türkiye and Iran, two significant regional powers crucial for regional security from an Arab perspective. Historical developments and geopolitical dynamics shaped the relationship between these two regional powers and the Arab region. This relationship fluctuated between cooperation and conflict. For over four centuries, the Ottoman Empire shielded the Arab region from European expansionism and now Türkiye is a strategic gateway to the West, connecting the region to NATO and Europe, while Iran acted as a buffer against Russian ambitions to reach the Mediterranean. Secular Türkiye became a source of emulation for many leaders in the region, while pre-revolutionary Iran maintained peaceful relations with the Arab Gulf States and Egypt, notwithstanding Iran’s long-held aspirations for influence over the Gulf area. The relationship witnessed clear strains in recent times, particularly after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the concern over the possible spread of Shiism and revolutionary waves in predominantly conservative Sunni monarchies. This became more evident during the Iraq-Iran war. Türkiye’s role in Syria and its military actions against the Kurds raise the concern of some Arab countries. The blockade against Qatar in 2017 demonstrated the relevance of Ankara’s regional role. As the region faces serious security challenges and evolving alliances, it is crucial to maintain positive relations with both countries and consider them as natural allies. Türkiye was instrumental in defending Qatar against a potential military intervention by other Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia. The war in Gaza highlighted the relevance of Iran in the region’s security. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, were designed in part to reconfigure the region’s alliances, pushing the Arab states closer to Israel and the United States, and distancing them from Türkiye and Iran.

Rule 5: Integrate the region into the world economy, while keeping it dependent and underdeveloped.

The Arab region is well integrated into the global economy, but in an imbalanced way that compromises its economic sovereignty and hinders its true development. This integration has manifested itself mainly through oil, investments flows, and external debt. The region, particularly the Gulf states, relies on its vast oil reserves (30 percent of the world’s total reserves) and has become a leading exporter of crude oil and natural gas, playing a critical role in the global energy market. However, as American scholars Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg argued in their 2010 book Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, the region’s economy is often described as “richer than developed.” Though a middle-income region with substantial wealth, its over-dependence on oil and rentierism (i.e., revenues generated through rents rather than real production), has created serious structural imbalances in the economy and hindered its diversification. Investment flows are another indication of the region’s integration in the world economy. The Arab world has great potential for investment in various sectors. However, most of the investment inflows, amounting to $76 billion in 2022 (compared to $82.9 billion outflows), are directed to the energy and real estate sectors. In addition, the Arab region is deeply embedded in the world economy through external loans and financial aids. In 2020, external debt reached $104 trillion. These come with severe conditions for liberalizing the economy and privatization. Both often lead to the adoption of austerity measures to pay back the international financial institutions (government spending as percentage of GDP decreased from 37 percent in 2010 to 28.7 percent in 2020).

The states of the region have increasingly been integrated into the global economy through free trade agreements which they have pursued to help diversify their economies and attract direct investment. However, the terms of trade work to the advantage of the developed and industrialized nations, thus continuing the state of dependency and structural imbalances. Surprisingly, the volume of trade between the Arab states and the outside world by far exceeds the intra-Arab trade, which constitutes only about 6 percent of their total trade volume. This lack of internal economic integration weakens the region’s economic cohesion and independence. Finally, the region’s heavy dependency is starkly manifested by the disproportionate military spending that amounts to over $200 billion, the highest percentage of GDP globally. Huge military expenditure diverts resources from critical sectors such as health, education, further intensifying the problem of underdevelopment. The Arab region is a net importer of food and agricultural products and relies on the global market for securing its food needs. It has become vulnerable to price fluctuation and some Arab states have accumulated huge debt while attempting to secure the food needs of their populations. American-led efforts to reconfigure the region and ensure the economic and political integration of Israel have surged recently but will most likely create further economic imbalances. The Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and five Arab states, including the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. These accords are designed to enhance the economic integration of Israel in the region and promote economic cooperation in important sectors like technology, finance, tourism, and healthcare. The idea is to utilize Israel’s technological expertise to stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship. However, Israel’s advanced economy might overshadow the struggling Arab economies, thus increasing their vulnerabilities and external dependence. 

Unresolved Challenges:

While external actors play a significant role in the region’s instability and underdevelopment, the region’s rulers bear equal or more responsibility. Despite nominal independence for over seventy or eighty years, Arab regimes have not been able to build effective institutions for regional economic integration, conflict resolution, and common development. More specifically, they failed to resolve four main challenges: identity, modernization, economic development, and liberties.

The region’s culture is predominantly Arab and religion predominantly Islamic. However, post-colonial leaders have embraced the nation-state model and promoted artificial or narrow nationalist identities, turning the Arab world, as Charle Glass described it, into “tribes with flags.” Post-colonial education curriculum and the socialization process resurrect ancient cultures and civilizations (Pharaonic, Phoenician, and Babylonian) as the basis of their nationalism. Parochial nationalisms are allowed to overshadow the larger Arab identity. Sub-national sentiments resurfaced in some Arab countries, calling for the recognition of their separate identities or even secession. In the absence of democratic and inclusionary systems, this creates major ruptures in state-society relations and often leads to repressing the legitimate right of sub-national groups. Nowhere is this identity crisis more evident than among younger generations who grow up with a confused sense of identity, torn between the Islamic, Arab, ancient, and/or narrow national sentiments. Arab nationalism is not based on race, but on culture and language. Today, both are in jeopardy. The phenomenon of “Arabizi”—a mix of Arabic and foreign languages, essentially English—is spreading rapidly among young Arabs and tech-savvy social media generations, along with a deep process of Westernization, further alienating them for their original language and heritage. History is reinvented, even faked, to promote a certain identity. In a 2019 Arab Barometer survey, 27 percent of young Arabs identified with their narrow national identity, while the majority felt more affiliated with the broader Arab and Islamic identities. This schism is unlikely to improve without coordinated efforts and an overhauling of the education systems to embrace and promote the Arab and Islamic cultures that are the cornerstone of the region’s authentic identity.

Modernization has lured Middle East leaders since the end of the nineteenth century. Acquiring Western systems of education, modern legal structures, military and bureaucratic organization, technologies and industries were viewed as key to the survival of their regimes and societies. The process was marked by deep cultural uprooting and dependencies, as it was conflated with Westernization and secularization in a region that was predominately Islamic in values and laws. These paradoxes and dependencies stand clear in most Middle Eastern cities. While boasting about the sight of the “tallest” skyscrapers, state of the art airports, and modern infrastructure, the understanding of modernity and the essence of progress remains utterly superficial. Arab states announce the building of knowledge economies and development of AI as their national priorities when they do not produce knowledge. The increasing reliance on the West for investment and capital, technology, and knowledge exacerbates the problem of dependency and undermines the distinct identity of the region. It grants international institutions and external powers the opportunity to shape the modernization agenda and strategies of development. This disparity exposes a hollow modernization process that places more emphasis on material advancement than intellectual capital, while ignoring the underlying dynamics that produced it. Modernity can take place in the Arab world only when the Arab individual restores her/his sense of self-respect and pride in their heritage that once produced a flourishing modernity and civilization and acquire the will to induce change and progress that align with their own values.

The state of development in Arab states is puzzling. Admittedly, the Arab region has achieved tangible economic developments over the last decades, but compared to other regions with similar conditions, it clearly lags. It is a middle income region, with an average per capita income of $5,530. However, it is the most unequal in the world, with top 10 percent of the population possesses 58 percent of the wealth in 2022. It suffers from a huge income disparity between states, with a per capita income of $68,793 in rich states like Qatar, and $314 and $824 in poor states like Somalia and Yemen, respectively. The region also suffers structural imbalances, reflected in the dependency on oil and natural gas; an interventionist state; and a reluctance to move on structural reform. On average, oil and natural gas represent between 30 and 60 percent of Arab states’ total GDP, demonstrating little success in economic diversification. Revenues from the energy sector drive investments in infrastructure and real estate projects. The Arab state intervenes heavily in the economy. It dictates the development strategies, controls the markets, and manages the process of class formation. The idea is not to allow the financial autonomy of a social class to threaten those in power. Consequently, markets suffer from distortions and capital outflow.

Due to fear of social unrest, the movement on structural reform has been markedly slow. This is manifested by the reluctance to introduce taxation altogether in some Arab states or implement efficient taxation systems, reduce government expenditure, and promote trade liberalization. They are also reluctant to introduce political and institutional reform, such as rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, and elimination of corruption. The Arab region has been witnessing increases in extreme poverty,  with one out of four children now living in poverty. Conflict-affected areas saw alarming increases in poverty—78.5 percent of the Yemeni population and 83 percent in Syria in 2019. The Arab region has a great wealth, its young population. It is a young region with 60 percent of the population under the age of 30. Yet, the region has the highest youth unemployment rates globally. It needs to create 10 million jobs by 2050, which would require an annual growth rate of 7.5 percent for a sustained period of 10 years (currently they score 3.2 percent). To meet these challenges, the Arab states need to develop a unified Arab economic system to promote trade, investments, human flow, and economic development across the region. They need to build a common market, free trade zones, harmonize regulations and customs, and invest in infrastructure to enhance intra-regional trade. All this requires a serious movement towards improving the quality of public administration and governance, economic diversification, export-oriented economies, business environment, contract enforcement, and judicial system. 

Democratization and respect for human rights are the most persistent deficit in the Arab region. Out of 22 Arab states, none are considered free. Only four are recognized as partly free—Morocco, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Lebanon. Democracy has not been able to take roots despite the existence of parliamentary systems and a democratic legacy, albeit a weak one (Tunisia’s first constitution of 1860, Egypt’s in 1866, the Ottoman in 1879, and Iranian in 1905). Multi-party systems had existed until the 1950s in Iraq, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, and Libya. Currently, authoritarianism is heavily entrenched and is widely exercised through a “deep state” (military, security and state apparatus). Liberties and respect for human rights are in short supply in Arab societies, which rank low on global indices. Despite the popular uprisings and the demands for freedom and dignity, authoritarianism has shown a tenacious resilience. It made a strong comeback, through regional undemocratic regimes and external actors. Leaders come to power through hereditary rule, sectarian arrangements, support of the military, and approval of external powers. They cannot be voted out of power or changed peacefully. Opposing them is an unbearably risky option. These practices promote contradictory views among Arab citizens about the validity of democracy. While believing in democracy as a better system overall, they question its ability to resolve problems and maintain stability. It should not come as a surprise that these types of regimes are closely supported, militarily and financially, by external powers. They all constitute a “global elite” that perpetuates certain strategic interests and polices of domination and control. 

The continued deficit in liberties and perpetuation of authoritarian rule through foreign aid hinders progress towards a democratic and free Arab world. It promotes political and sectarian tension in society and precludes its progress towards inclusion and full participation in the decisionmaking process.

Internal Colonization:

The incumbent Arab regimes cannot resolve these challenges and cannot undertake a genuine reform. They are trapped in the “King’s Dilemma,” meaning that profound reform and true openings will do away with their regimes. Therefore, they lack the will and the incentive to do so. Instead of leading their people towards true independence and self-determination, they have acquired and adopted many of the traits and practices of the former colonial powers to stay in power. The first trait is that the state is ruled by a minority regime, an oligarchy, whether it is a dynasty, royal family, tribe, military general, or an autocrat. Ironically, this model is supported by Western states that find it easier to deal with autocrats than democratically elected governments accountable to their people. The Arab Spring presented an excellent opportunity to change this formula, but Western countries were more concerned about their strategic interests and preferred authoritarian stability to the unpredictability of democracy. Instead of supporting the emerging democratic forces in the region, Western states tacitly endorsed General Abdelfatah El-Sisi’s military coup in Egypt, refusing to call it a coup to avoid cutting off the military aid it provided to the country. Similarly, they acquiesced to the emergence of autocratic rule in Tunisia, a country once listed as free. The looming influence of Islamist groups and their success to come to power through democratic processes haunted external actors and further complicated matters in both nations.

Second, as a ruling minority that does not believe in democratic processes, Arab regimes operate with a high degree of autonomy from their societies. They know that they are the makers and breakers of classes, and not the other way around. Most ascended to power by force or tradition, and not through democratic elections. As a result, like the old colonial powers, they impose their visions, values, ideologies, structures, rules, and development strategies from above, and not through a deliberative process, in which large segments of society are involved and partake in the decisionmaking. This lack of engagement and disconnect creates a state of alienation between the ruling elite and the rest of the population, concerning core issues such as the ongoing process of Westernization, social justice and distribution, and security. Recently, the Gaza war has revealed a huge gap that separates those elites from their populations. 

The third striking similarity to the colonial practices is the extraction of resources by the ruling minority within Arab regimes. Most, if not all, Arab regimes suffer from a lack of transparency and financial accountability. The unchecked accumulation of wealth by families or autocrats reveals a staggering level of corruption and exploitation, reminiscent of colonial practices. For instance, the amount of gold and cash found in Ben Ali’s and Qadhafi’s coffers was shocking. Military budgets are often entered as a single line in national budgets, with no overseeing from the legislative bodies. Special funds are controlled by the ruling regime, or the autocrat, with little transparency, and most are invested in Western countries (Egypt under Sisi has accumulated $160 billion in external debts, while he personally controls some of the country’s special funds). This happens in countries with one third or more of the population live under poverty lines. The unbridled extraction of resources by a tiny ruling minority echoes the exploitative practices of the colonizers. It aggravates social inequalities and hinders the prospects for sustainable development.

The fourth commonality to the colonial practices is the external affiliation of Arab regimes. The post-colonial Arab state is still dependent on the external powers for its security, defense, and sustaining its economy—in a word, for “survival.” Former U.S. President Donald Trump did not hesitate in making the Saudi Arabian king face this brutal fact, reminding him that he “wouldn’t last two weeks without U.S. support.”The same applies to Egypt, Syria, and perhaps the rest of the region’s Arab states. This raises controversy about Western values and strategic interests. It is not a chicken or egg dilemma. Despite their claims to the contrary, Western countries are not interested in promoting democracy in the Arab world, as this could easily bring Islamists or democratic and accountable governments to power and jeopardize Western interests (oil, protection of Israel, unfettered access to water and airways, and preventing the rise of a strong regional power). This explains President Biden’s change of heart towards General El-Sisi—who is evidently a grave abuser of human rights and violator of the most fundamental democratic values—or the willingness to let Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman get away unscathed with his brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This support not only perpetuates authoritarian rule and stifles pro-democracy movements, but also consolidates Western hegemony and unfavorable geopolitical dynamics in the region. 

Finally, this situation cannot be maintained without the use of coercion and suppression of any resistance to this type of rule, which constitutes another similarity with the colonial rule. Lacking electoral legitimacy and with no possibility of voting them out, Arab regimes must resort to repression and stifling dissent to maintain themselves in power. Rich authoritarian Arab states, in addition, use patronage and handouts to coopt their population and buy off their acquiescence. The military, state security, and bureaucracy are inflated to create a climate of fear and intimidation. The most advanced and well budgeted and equipped sectors are the security apparatus and intelligence agencies. Arab militaries amass foreign-bought weapons that they use in their proxy wars, against their own people, or stockpile to collect dust in warehouses. Their bureaucracies employ millions of citizens, stripping them of their financial independence and rendering them dependent on state salaries. This does not provide the space for the emergence of a financially independent middle class and the development of democracy. 

On the surface, Arab regimes seem resilient and strong, mainly due to coercion and Western backing, but their apparent strength masks a considerable degree of fragility. This was no clearer than during the popular uprisings of 2011. Fierce, authoritarian regimes, such as those of Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Mubarak, and Libya’s Qaddafi, crumpled before the popular uprisings that challenged their authority and their external patrons.

A New System of Arab States:

Addressing Arab leaders at the Manama, Bahrain Summit on May 16th, 2024, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres captured the Arab saga and prescribed the way forward:

“You have the resources. You have the culture. You have the people.

But there is one core condition for success in today’s world: unity.

Time and again, history has shown that divisions allow outsiders to intervene – promoting conflicts, stoking sectarian tensions and inadvertently fueling terrorism.

These are obstacles to peaceful development and the well-being of your peoples.

Overcoming those obstacles requires breaking the vicious circle of division and foreign manipulation – and moving forward together to build a more peaceful and prosperous future for the people of the Arab world and beyond.

There is no better moment for the Arab region to come together.

Unity and solidarity throughout the Arab world would amplify the vital voice of the region and further boost your influence on the global stage.

It can help this region find peace, make the most of its enormous potential, and further contribute to the global good.”

While Guterres was right about the message, he delivered it to the wrong audience. Arab leaders have totally different agendas, rooted not in unity, but mainly in survival.

The unity of the Arab region is imperative. While its reconfiguration is needed, it must come from within and not be externally driven. It needs to be based on genuine common bonds and aspirations. 

It is widely acknowledged that the “Middle East” is a misnomer. It is a geopolitical term relative to the West and is often manipulated to align with its geostrategic agenda. It has been used to integrate states that are not an integral part of this region or share its culture and expand or shrink its geographic boundaries to make it malleable to evolving Western strategic interests. The Middle East as a term neither provides a concrete nationality nor reflects the cultural characteristics and bonds that tie the region’s peoples. Obviously, we cannot have a fresh start with a wrong name. In addition, the issues of unity and diversity, regional structures, economic development and integration, democracy and governance, and relationship with the West need to be addressed.

Despite their current fragmentation, the Arab peoples share important commonalities, making the idea of unity or functional integration a legitimate one. This invites a reimagination of the region from the Middle East to the “Arab Homeland” or the “Arab Nation” to reflect its shared identity and rich heritage, highlight the historical experience that transcends the artificial borders, and unleash the immense potential for economic development and progress. At the same time, the Arab region displays a rich mosaic of multiple ethnicities, cultures, and sects. This requires the restoration of the culture of pluralism and coexistence that has characterized the region for centuries and giving serious attention to the recognition and respect of diversity. 

Since the 1990s, the number of failed states has increased rapidly (Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Iraq). This is due to multiple factors including sectarian divisions, incompetent leadership, mismanagement, and external interventions. The absence of effective regional structures for conflict resolution and economic development contributed greatly to this deterioration. The existing ones are paralyzed by conflicting interests and contradictory agendas. A new system of Arab states will require the establishment of robust structures and institutions for containing and resolving conflicts and peacebuilding.

The Arab region is rich in human and natural resources, but it is mismanaged. It lacks effective utilization of resources. The global trend is for states to move towards regional economic cooperation and integration. This opportunity was available to Arab states for more than eight decades but was sadly missed. Instead, single states develop their own “national visions” and economic strategies that fall short of achieving a sustainable diversified economy and economic sovereignty. The alternative lies in the structural cooperation and integration of the Arab states to achieve a true economic development. As Guterres advised, this is the path to unlock the region’s potential, eliminate poverty, and promote shared prosperity. 

The Arab region suffers from a clear deficit in democracy and good governance. The achievement of tangible progress and change in the region is predicated on both. This includes the empowerment of Arab citizens; broadening the scope of participation in the decisionmaking process; establishing representative governments and legislative bodies with real authority and oversight; respecting pluralism; human rights; the rule of law; and promoting transparency and accountability.

Finally, the complicated issue of the relationship with external powers needs to be addressed. The Arabs’ perception of the West has changed over the years, from fascination by its technological advancement and progress to viewing it as a belligerent power that cripples the region and undermines its independence. The West’s blind support for Israel, its backing of authoritarian regimes, and siffling the region’s potential are indicative of the need to reconsider the nature of this relationship. If they were to be asked about their expectations of the West, particularly after the Gaza crisis began, the response of many Arabs would be for the West “to leave us alone and get out of the region.” Only accountable democratic regimes can restore balance and respect into this relationship and execute the much-needed structural reforms, economic development, and governance.

This article was originally published by the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD)